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I. INTRODUCTION 
Social security spending accounts for almost 30 per cent of public expenditure 
and is projected to reach £74.7 billion in 1992–93. Almost half of this spending 
goes to the elderly. The cost of social security to the elderly has grown steadily 
in the post-war period, and will continue to grow given current policy, as the 
number of elderly people increases. The implied tax burden on those of working 
age will grow even more quickly than spending, unless the basic state pension is 
allowed to continue dropping relative to wages, as the number of those of 
working age, relative to the number of pensioners, declines in the next century. 
Despite this large and growing cost, the centre-piece of state provision, the 
flat-rate retirement pension, has fallen relative to average earnings, and this fall 
seems set to continue. Indeed, the flat-rate pension is now significantly lower 
than the means-tested income support, so that a pensioner with no private income 
is automatically entitled to income support, as well as the flat-rate retirement 
pension. This is certainly not what Beveridge had in mind when he designed his 
system in 1942.
1 
If we continue with current policies, the principal benefit, the flat-rate 
pension, will fall further and further behind average earnings, and yet continue to 
be very costly. If we attempt to increase the flat-rate pension to a more generous 
level, and subsequently maintain it in relation to average earnings, the additional 
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expense will be enormous, and not well targeted on the poor. Some new ideas 
seem vital, as does a long-term strategy for implementing them, since any 
changes in this field must be phased in slowly so as to avoid unreasonable 
disruption of expectations. 
In what follows we begin by giving a brief description of how the current 
social security system works as it affects the elderly, before going on to describe 
future demographic trends and the effects these are likely to have on costs. In 
Section IV the incomes of the pensioner population are described in some detail, 
including the way they have changed over the past decade. Given this 
information, Section V looks at how pensions might best be provided in the 
future and what options are open to the Government. 
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Easily the largest item of social security expenditure on the elderly is the basic 
state pension. This cost £24.7 billion in 1991–92. £5.8 billion was spent on 
income-related benefits — income support, housing benefit and community 
charge benfit — whilst £1 billion was spent on the State Earnings-Related 
Pension Scheme (SERPS). 
The basic state pension is a flat-rate benefit payable to all individuals over 
state pension age (currently 65 for men and 60 for women) who have paid 
National Insurance contributions (NICs) for around nine-tenths of their working 
lives. This contributions test is eased by a number of provisions, such as home 
responsibility protection for years spent bringing up children, which reduce the 
number of years of contributions necessary to obtain a full pension. Reduced 
pensions are payable where contributions gaps remain. While virtually all men 
over pension age receive the full pension, around a quarter of women with 
pensions deriving from their own contributions have their pension reduced. 
The other main government expenditure on social security for pensioners is 
on the income-related benefits — income support, housing benefit and 
community charge benefit. These are received by 1.5 million, 2 million and 3.2 
million pensioners respectively. Thus around 15 per cent of pensioners receive 
income support and one-third receive some form of income-related benefit. 
Income support entitlement is reduced by 100 per cent of any private income, 
housing benefit by 65 per cent, and community charge benefit by 15 per cent. 
Of the 1.5 million who receive income support, the vast majority — around 
1.3 million — are also in receipt of the basic state pension. This is made possible 
not solely by the fact that some of these people are receiving reduced amounts of 
the pension, but because income support rates are actually higher than the level 
of the basic state pension. Thus any pensioners whose only source of income is 
the basic pension will also be eligible for some income-related benefit. This 
situation has been particularly evident since the replacement of supplementary 
benefit by income support in 1988, since when, for example, the income support Fiscal Studies 
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level for a single pensioner over 80 has gone up by 40 per cent compared with a 
rise of 31 per cent in the level of the basic pension. The income support and 
pension levels applicable from October 1992 are shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Pension and Income Support Rates for Pensioners 
 
Retirement pension  
(£ per week) 
Income support  
(£ per week) 
Age < 75    
Single person  54.25  59.15 
Married couple  86.70  91.95 
Age 75-79    
Single person  54.25  61.10 
Married couple  86.70  94.60 
Age 80+    
Single person  54.40  65.20 
Married couple  87.20  99.15 
The relatively low level of the retirement pension has followed a period, 
since 1980, during which it has been increased annually in line with price rises 
as opposed to the previously used formula of rising with the higher of prices and 
earnings. The result is that the basic pension for a single person now stands at 
just over 15 per cent of average male earnings as against a high of 20 per cent in 
1977–78. 
The final form of state-provided income for the elderly comes from the State 
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme. This was introduced in 1978 following the 
1975 Social Security Pensions Act. In 1990, 3 million pensioners were receiving 
an average of just over 9 per week from SERPS. 
Employees earning more than the lower earnings limit (LEL) for NI 
contributions of £54 p.w. in 1992–93 (just over 15 per cent of average male 
earnings) pay Class 1 NICs and earn entitlement to SERPS as well as the basic 
pension, unless they are members of an approved occupational pension scheme 
or personal pension plan, in which case they contract out of SERPS, pay lower 
NICs and do not earn SERPS entitlements. Members of SERPS will receive 
SERPS pensions of 20 per cent of their average earnings between the LEL and 
the upper earnings limit (UEL) through their working lives. The UEL is between 
6.5 and 7.5 times the LEL, and is currently 405 p.w. or 120 per cent of average 
male earnings. 
SERPS payments will be much less generous in the next century than was 
intended when the scheme was first introduced, following amendments made by 
the 1986 Social Security Act. Prior to the 1986 Act, SERPS was to provide 25 What Pension Should the State Provide? 
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per cent of average earnings in the best 20 years of working life, rather than 20 
per cent of average earnings over the whole working life as now. 
The current cost of SERPS is only £1 billion p.a., because relatively few of 
the retired have entitlements yet, and those who do have low entitlements. The 
cost will grow steadily until the scheme reaches maturity around 2030, when 
almost all of the retired will have complete SERPS entitlements. Although the 
cost will grow, SERPS entitlements will for many be rather small fractions of 
past average earnings if current procedures for indexing the UEL are continued. 
The UEL is at present increased in line with the LEL, which is itself tied to the 
flat-rate pension. All three have therefore grown in line with prices rather than 
earnings since the beginning of the 1980s. The UEL has fallen from 140 per cent 
of average earnings to 120 per cent and will continue to fall. With price 
indexation, and 1.5 per cent p.a. real earnings growth, the UEL will be only two-
thirds of average male earnings by 2030, implying a maximum SERPS pension 
of only 13 per cent of average male earnings.
2 On the other hand the same rate of 
indexation of the LEL will increase the SERPS entitlements of those with 
earnings below the UEL. 
The relationship between SERPS and private pension provision is a complex 
one, the details of which we do not explore here. Nevertheless some details of 
the two major forms of private pension provision should be given to inform the 
discussion that follows. Occupational pension contributions are made by just 
over half the working population, a level of coverage which has remained steady 
since the mid-1960s. Occupational pensions are schemes operated by employers 
and are usually ‘defined benefit’ schemes; that is, benefits payable on retirement 
are defined as a proportion of final salary dependent upon the number of years in 
the scheme. The commonest benefits offered are of one-sixtieth of final salary 
for each year spent in the scheme, up to a maximum of two-thirds of final salary. 
Most schemes are contracted out of SERPS so the employer and scheme 
members pay a reduced rate of NICs. Currently just over half of all those over 
pension age receive pensions from them. 
The other private pensions which allow members to contract out of SERPS 
are Personal Pension Plans (PPPs). Individuals have been able to contract out 
into defined contribution PPPs since 1988 and the take-up of them has been very 
high, partly as a result of an extra 2 per cent incentive reduction in the NI rate 
offered by the Government on top of the basic 5.8 per cent rebate. By April 
1990, 4 million individuals had opted to take up a personal pension; of these, 2.7 
million were men. The take-up rate among men aged 22 to 26 approached 50 per 
cent, though it is much lower for older individuals, as one would expect given 
the structure of incentives (see Disney and Whitehouse (1992) for a full 
discussion). 
                                                                                                                                    
2 See Disney and Whitehouse (1991) for further discussion. Fiscal Studies 
62 
Rather than being run by employers and offering pensions based on final 
salary, PPPs are owned by individuals and the pension they eventually receive 
will depend on how much they contribute and how much accumulates in the fund 
from its investments. This explains their description as ‘defined contribution’ 
pensions. Being a recent innovation, PPPs do not currently provide income to 
many pensioners, but given their popularity, especially among younger members 
of the work-force, they may have an important role to play in the future. 
What we see by way of government social security policy, then, is an 
expensive basic pension paid irrespective of means to virtually all pensioners but 
at a very low level, with income-related benefits paid at a slightly more generous 
level to those without other income. The value of the basic pension has been 
allowed to fall relative to average earnings over the past decade and for a single 
person now stands at just 15 per cent of average male earnings. The other 
government-provided pension, SERPS, is currently relatively unimportant and 
even at maturity will not provide a very generous level of earnings replacement. 
The Government’s main response to these problems has been to encourage 
private pension provision. Occupational pensions cover around half of the work-
force at any one time. Personal pensions are now held by around one-quarter of 
the work-force. 
III. FUTURE COSTS 
The direction of government policy regarding support for the elderly must be 
heavily influenced by concern about future demographic trends and the 
associated costs of pension provision. The direction of these trends is well 
known and we describe them here briefly to inform our further discussion. 
TABLE 2 
Population Projections for Great Britain 
Age-group 1990  2010  2030  2050 
Children   11.2  11.8  11.9  11.2 
(0-15) (20.1)  (20.2)  (19.9)  (19.3) 
Number of working age  34.3  35.3  33.7  33.7 
(men 16-64), women (16-59)  (61.5)  (60.6)  (56.6)  (58.0) 
Number of pensionable age   10.3  11.2  14.0  13.2 
(men 65+, women 60+)  (18.4)  (19.2)  (23.5)  (22.7) 
Total 55.8  58.3  59.6  58.1 
 (100)  (100)  (100)  (100) 
Number of working age per person over 
pension age 
3.3 3.2  2.4  2.6 
Source: Government Actuary, 1990. What Pension Should the State Provide? 
63 
There are currently 10.3 million men and women over state pensionable age 
compared with 34.3 million working-age individuals, representing a ratio of 3.3 
working-age persons to every person over retirement age. Over the next 20 years 
or so these numbers are not expected to change significantly, but from 2010 
major changes will occur. These are set out in Table 2. The Government 
Actuary’s central prediction is that by 2030 there will be 33.7 million people of 
working age and 14 million over pensionable age — a ratio of 2.4 to 1. This 
significant shift in demographic structure and concomitant worsening in the old-
age dependency ratio, together with the approaching maturity of SERPS, have 
focused attention on future costs and sustainability of state pension 
commitments. 
Based on these demographic trends, it is possible to forecast future costs of 
the basic and earnings-related state pensions. Figure 1 shows the projected future 
costs of just the basic pension under two alternative scenarios: continued price 
indexation of the basic pension or earnings indexation (assuming real earnings 
growth of 1.5 per cent per year). The difference in effect is substantial. 
Assuming price indexation, costs in 1990 prices will rise to a maximum of £34.7 
billion in 2030–31, dropping to £32.6 billion by 2050–51. Under the alternative 
of earnings indexation, costs would rise to nearly £80 billion by 2050–51, more 
than three times current cost. 
FIGURE 1 
Effects of Price and Earnings Indexation on the Cost of the Basic State Pension 
 Fiscal Studies 
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If the basic pension does continue to be indexed in line with prices then the 
relative roles of it and SERPS will change dramatically as the annual cost of 
SERPS rises to around £15 billion by 2030. At present, spending on the basic 
pension is more than 20 times greater than that on SERPS. By 2030, the ratio 
could be almost as little as two to one. This would imply an enormous alteration 
in the spending priorities of the state. 
The difference in costs between price and earnings indexation is brought out 
strongly if we consider the NI rates which would be required under each 
scenario. At present, the employees’ NI contribution rate is 9 per cent and the 
employers’ rate 10.4 per cent, giving a combined rate of 19.4 per cent of gross 
earnings. Were price indexation to be continued, NI contribution rates could 
actually be reduced to around 18 per cent by 2020 or 2030 and as far as 14 per 
cent by 2050. This reflects the fact that higher contributions from higher 
earnings would more than offset the effect of higher costs if the pension is 
allowed to fall relative to average earnings. On this basis, the basic pension 
would stand at just 8% of average male earnings by 2030 and 6% by 2050. 
If, on the other hand, the pension were to be raised in line with earnings, and 
thus maintain its current level of 15 per cent of average male earnings, NI rates 
would have to increase to 21 per cent in 2010, 23.5 per cent in 2020 and 26.4 per 
cent by 2030, a rise of around 7 percentage points on current rates. To return the 
level of the state pension to 20 per cent of average male earnings would require 
NI rates of 28 per cent in 2010, 31 per cent in 2020 and 34 per cent by 2030, a 
rise of around 15 percentage points on current rates. 
All these figures, of course, depend on a number of assumptions regarding 
future fertility, mortality, activity and unemployment rates, but the broad picture 
is similar under any reasonable set of assumptions. Continuing to pay the basic 
pension at its current real level relative to prices will be easily affordable 
compared with current expenditure, but its value will drop to an even smaller 
proportion of average earnings. In this context, it should be remembered that the 
current pension, low though it is, is worth nearly twice as much relative to prices 
as it was as recently as 1960, but the same amount relative to earnings. If, 
instead, it were to maintain its current position relative to earnings, the cost of 
provision would become very high indeed, involving a significant, though by no 
means fanciful, rise in direct tax rates. Furthermore, this expenditure would 
simply be on maintaining the value of a benefit that is currently below income 
support levels. To return the state pension to its peak relative to average earnings 
would require an increase in tax rates by 2030 which would be enough to double 
current spending on the health service. 
IV. PENSIONERS’ INCOMES 
Any choice about how benefits should be paid to pensioners requires a detailed 
knowledge of the levels, composition and distribution of pensioners’ incomes. In What Pension Should the State Provide? 
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this section we use data from various years of the Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES) to describe their incomes and to show how they have been changing. We 
begin by looking at pensioners’ incomes in 1989 and comparing them with their 
incomes in 1979, and then look in more detail at incomes from occupational 
pensions. 
TABLE 3 
Pensioners’ Incomes, 1979 and 1989 
1989 prices, £ per week 
 1979  1989 
Net equivalent income    
Mean 110  140 
Median 94  109 
Earnings: percentage with some  16%  11% 
Non-zero mean  59  80 
Non-zero median  41  44 
Private pension: percentage with some  41%  55% 
Non-zero mean  36  51 
Non-zero median  18  28 
Investment income: percentage with some  62%  75% 
Non-zero mean  12  22 
Non-zero median  3  5 
Social security: percentage with some  99%  99% 
Non-zero mean  58  65 
Non-zero median  56  66 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 1979 and 1989 FES. 
Incomes are measured for family units, i.e. a single pensioner or a married 
couple is each taken to be a single unit. To allow comparisons among these two 
groups, total incomes are equivalised.
3 Total incomes are also shown net of tax.
4 
By contrast, each component of income is shown unequivalised and gross of tax. 
Table 3 shows mean and median net equivalent incomes of pensioners in 
1979 and 1989. Also shown are the proportions of pensioners with each of the 
four main components of income — earnings, private pensions, income from 
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investment and income from the state — along with non-zero means and 
medians of each. All figures are in 1989 prices to make direct comparisons 
possible. 
Between 1979 and 1989 average pensioner incomes increased by around 27 
per cent in real terms, with the median increasing by 16 per cent. While virtually 
all pensioners had some income from social security in both periods, the 
proportions with the other forms of income changed substantially. The 
proportion with some earned income fell from 16 per cent to 11 per cent, 
reflecting the well-documented fall in participation rates among older people 
both before and after state pension age. By contrast, the proportions with private 
pensions and income from investment rose from 41 per cent to 55 per cent and 
from 62 per cent to 75 per cent respectively. Mean and median income levels 
from all sources rose over the period among those with some income from that 
source. 
The biggest increases in levels were also in levels of private pensions and 
investment incomes. Among those with some private pension, the mean level 
increased by about 40 per cent and the median by 55 per cent. The increases in 
investment incomes were larger still in percentage terms but from a much lower 
level. The much higher means than medians in the latter case result from the fact 
that a large number of those with some income from savings have very small 
amounts indeed, coming as interest on a few pounds in the building society, 
while a few have very large amounts of investment income. 
The actual (unequivalised) mean and median levels of total net income by sex 
and marital status in each of the two years are shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
Average Net Incomes of Pensioners, 1979 and 1989 
1989 prices, £ per week 









Single men  58  70  67  81 
Single women  54  60  63  79 
Married couples  98  117  114  150 
We have seen that the average real incomes of pensioners as a whole rose 
considerably over the decade to 1989, but these average levels and changes tell 
us nothing, of course, about the income distribution among pensioners. In Table 
5 we show the median income level of pensioners in each income decile in 1989, 
and by what percentage it had changed in real terms since 1979, and in Figure 2 
the mean level of income from each source in each of the 10 deciles is shown. 
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TABLE 5 
Real Changes in Decile Medians, 1979-89 
Decile  Median net equivalent income, 1989  
(£ per week) 
Real percentage change, 
1979-89 
1 67  3 
2 81  9 
3 90  13 
4 99  16 
5 106  16 
6 113  17 
7 128  21 
8 154  29 
9 196  35 
10 308  44 
FIGURE 2 
Income Composition by Decile, 1989 
 
It is quite clear from Table 5 that the income distribution among pensioners is 
quite widely spread. The top decile median is more than four-and-a-half times 
the bottom decile median. It is also clear that gains in income levels have been 
very unevenly distributed. The bottom decile has seen only a very small increase 
in its median income level, whilst the top decile has seen its income rise by more Fiscal Studies 
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than 40 per cent. Part of the explanation for this is seen in Figure 2, which shows 
that among the lower deciles, social security is easily the most important income 
source, and of course its level has risen very little relative to levels of investment 
and occupational pension income which form the most important income sources 
of the top deciles. Nevertheless, income from the state still forms half of total 
income in 1989 even among the eighth decile. 
Table 6 provides the same information as Figure 2 but for 1969 and 1979 as 
well as 1989 and this time broken down by income quintile rather than by decile. 
Also shown are the incomes of 65- to 69-year-olds in 1989, again broken down 
by quintile. The different incomes by year show the way in which pensioner 
incomes have been developing over the past two decades, how the distribution of 
incomes has been widening and how the importance of private pension and 
investment incomes has been increasing at every point in the income distribution 
and particularly in the top two quintiles. 
TABLE 6 
Pensioner Incomes, 1969, 1979 and 1989 
£ per week, 1989 prices 
Quintile 1969  1979  1989  1989,   
65- to 69-
year-olds 
1 Social  security  34  53  56  65 
 Private  income  2  3  5  7 
 Earnings  ― 2  ― 1 
2 Social  security  43  60  69  75 
 Private  income  7  5  11  15 
 Earnings  1  2  ― 1 
3 Social  security  45  59  69  67 
 Private  income  8  9  16  29 
 Earnings  2  3  2  7 
4 Social  security  43  60  68  70 
 Private  income  19  20  45  57 
 Earnings  13  6  6  18 
5 Social  security  32  56  62  62 
 Private  income  74  75  145  162 
 Earnings  56  26  36  69 
 
Between 1969 and 1979, average amounts of private income (investments and 
private pensions) changed hardly at all at any point in the income distribution, 
whilst the amount of income from the state increased substantially at every point. What Pension Should the State Provide? 
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This increase reflected indexation of the state pension faster than price rises, the 
introduction of a national housing benefit scheme in the early 1970s and a falling 
number of pensioners living with younger relatives and appearing to have no 
social security income of their own. Also evident between the two years is a fall 
in the importance of earned income which, as we have seen, is a trend that 
continued over the 1980s. 
The changes between 1979 and 1989 have been very different. Levels of 
social security income have not risen by as much, though SERPS has increased 
entitlements, especially among the younger groups. The major change at all 
income levels has been in amounts of private income, with particularly large 
increases in the top two quintiles. The third quintile of 65- to 69-year-olds in 
1989 had substantially more private income than the fourth quintile of 
pensioners in 1969 or 1979. 
The separate numbers for the youngest pensioners in 1989 give some idea as 
to how incomes are continuing to develop. They are significantly higher than the 
equivalent incomes for the pensioner population as a whole. The mean income 
among 65- to 69-year-olds was one-fifth higher than that among those over the 
age of 75. Partly this reflects inadequate indexation provisions for private 
pensions and falling real values of investment incomes as time passes, but 
importantly it also reflects the fact that younger pensioners are considerably 
more likely to have some income from an occupational pension — 63 per cent of 
65- to 69-year-olds against just 52 per cent of 75- to 79-year-olds and 46 per cent 
of 80- to 84-year-olds. This means that as time passes, we can expect older 
pensioners to become better off as more of them have occupational pension 
provision. Since 1979, there have been large increases in the proportion at all 
ages with some income from private pensions; this trend is likely to continue, 
though primarily among the older groups, for some time to come. 
TABLE 7 
Percentage of Birth Cohorts Recording Occupational Pension Receipt 




1900-04 54  4  26 
1905-09 56  5  30 
1910-14 61  7  33 
1915-19 67  11  40 
1920-24 70  17  46 
1925-29                .  22 49 
Note: Proportions of men aged 65 and over and women aged 60 and over with income from an occupational 
pension by birth cohort. 
Source: Family Expenditure Survey data, 1970-90. Fiscal Studies 
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More detail on how the proportion of the elderly receiving occupational 
pensions has increased is shown in Table 7, which uses FES data from 1970 to 
1990 to look at the proportion of each cohort of pensionable age recording 
receipt of some occupational pension. 
Of men born in the period 1900–04, and so reaching state pension age 
between 1965 and 1969, just over one-half had income from an occupational 
pension, rising to 70 per cent of cohorts that retired more recently. Among 
women, the increases have been more dramatic, with more than one-fifth of 
married women now receiving an occupational pension along with nearly one-
half of single or widowed women. Continued large increases in the proportion of 
those reaching retirement age in receipt of an occupational pension are unlikely 
among men, but among women the trend is likely to continue. Information from 
the DSS retirement survey (DSS, 1992) suggests that while only one-third of 
women aged 67 to 79 ever joined a scheme, this was true of nearly half of those 
aged 55 to 57. The recent growth in personal pension coverage may have a 
significant impact on pensioner incomes in the next century, particularly since 
many of those who have taken up a personal pension would not otherwise have 
had any private pension provision. 
TABLE 8 
Average Occupational Pension Receipt by Birth Cohort, Sex and Marital Status 
(men aged 65-69, women aged 60-64) 
£ per week, 1990 prices 
Cohort Men  Married  women  Single/widowed 
women 
1900-04 40  . . 
1905-09 45  34  30 
1910-14 44  29  36 
1915-19 57  29  35 
1920-24 65  29  40 
1925-29  .  31 47 
Note: Average value of occupational pension received by men aged 65-69 and women aged 60-64 with income 
from an occupational pension by birth cohort. 
Source: Family Expenditure Survey data, 1970-79. 
In addition to this rise in numbers receiving occupational pensions, there has 
been an increase in the average value of pensions received, as we saw above. 
Again this is predominantly a cohort effect. Younger cohorts entering retirement 
will have higher pensions partly because they have spent a larger proportion of 
their working lives as members of schemes and partly because of their higher 
final salaries. Also important has been legislation making better provision for the 
preservation of pensions on changing jobs. Table 8 carries out the same analysis What Pension Should the State Provide? 
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as Table 7, but this time for pension levels. Men in the earliest birth cohort 
(1900–04) in receipt of an occupational pension received a pension of around 40 
per week in 1990 prices on average in the early years of retirement. Those with 
an occupational pension born 20 years later started retirement with a pension 
around 25 per week higher. Similar increases are observed for single and 
widowed women, though the amounts are stable for married women. 
Overall among pensioners we see a picture of increasing incomes for many as 
the coverage and level of private income grow, but still with a large number 
dependent on relatively low social security benefits. The income distribution has 
widened since 1979 and pensioners have become less homogeneous as a group. 
The most important reasons for these changes have been increased coverage and 
levels of occupational pensions. There is every reason to expect these trends to 
continue, especially in increased levels of pensions. 
V. WHAT PENSION SHOULD THE STATE PROVIDE? 
A number of facts stand out from our analysis so far. The first is that paying 
social security benefits to pensioners is already expensive. The second is that 
demographic change and the maturation of SERPS will make it prohibitively 
expensive to index the basic state pension in line with earnings. If it is indexed in 
line with prices, its relative value will become derisory. Thirdly, while a large 
number of pensioners remain relatively poor and almost entirely dependent on 
state benefits, a growing minority are becoming quite well off. Whilst the 
poorest pensioners in 1989 were little better off than the poorest in 1979, the 
richest in 1989 were more than 40 per cent better off than the richest in 1979. 
Given these facts and given the current low level of the retirement pension 
and the higher levels of income support, some questions must be put about the 
role of the basic pension. It is not a benefit which is high enough to provide a 
reasonable level of earnings replacement. Nor is it enough to lift pensioners clear 
of the income support (IS) system. Raising it to current IS levels in each of the 
three IS pensioner age bands would cost at least £1.5 billion whilst increasing 
the incomes only of those above the IS line. Raising it to, say, 20 per cent of 
average male earnings (its level relative to earnings in the late 1970s) — about 
72 per week for a single person — would cost around 5 billion net (equivalent to 
more than 2p on the basic rate of income tax). This would be of greater benefit to 
those not currently on income support than to the very poorest. Raising IS levels 
to the same level would cost £2.5 billion, targeting all extra expenditure on the 
poorest. 
These options for the Government are illustrated in Figure 3. Along the 
horizontal axis is gross income (i.e. all non-state incomes) and along the vertical 
axis net (disposable) income. The three lines shown are intended to represent the 
relationship between gross and net income under three possible benefit regimes. Fiscal Studies 
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The slopes of the lines indicate the rate at which net income increases as gross 
income increases. 
FIGURE 3 
A Graphical Representation of Different Pension Schemes 
 
Line B represents a system of purely income-related benefits. If someone has 
no original income then he receives £X from the state. As original income 
increases the income from the state is withdrawn pound for pound until it is 
exhausted at point Z. From then on net income rises with gross income except in 
so far as some may be lost through income tax. This is effectively a description 
of how the current income support system works. 
If line B represents a purely income-related system, then line A represents a 
system of universal benefit payment, with everybody receiving £Y, but this is not 
withdrawn as gross income increases. Y is less than X because the expense 
involved in paying money to everybody, and not recovering it from those on 
higher incomes, means that a lower basic benefit would have to be paid. Any 
increase in gross income is matched by an increase in net income, again other 
than as a result of income tax payments. 
Finally line C represents a universal benefit paid at the same level as the 
income-related benefit. Although increases in gross income result in some 
increase in net income, the flatness of the line indicates the high marginal tax 
rate which would have to be levied to pay for the high universal benefit. 
Given the known shape of the income distribution, and the known costs of 
various alternatives, the questions that need to be addressed by future What Pension Should the State Provide? 
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government policy relate to the position and slope of the lines shown in Figure 3. 
This illustrates the framework within which policy for providing minimum 
incomes for pensioners must be made. To a large extent the choice of benefit 
regime reflects a choice over the relationship between original income and net 
income. 
The effects of possible choices can be seen by looking at the distributional 
consequences of some illustrative policies. To do this some simulations were run 
using the IFS Tax and Benefit Model, a computer model based on a 
representative sample of the UK population, which allows the effects of various 
tax and benefit policies to be examined (see Johnson, Stark and Webb (1990) for 
details). For illustrative purposes it was assumed that an extra £1 billion per year 
was available to be spent on social security benefits for pensioners. Three 
possible ways of spending this money were modelled: firstly, spending all the 
money on raising means-tested benefits; secondly, spending it on raising the 
pension and means-tested benefits; and thirdly, spending it just on raising the 
pension. The results are shown in Table 9. This shows average gains under each 
policy in pounds per week at each level of original income. Original income is 
defined  as all  income before  any taxes  have been  paid or  benefits  received. 
The numbers in each of these categories are shown in the second column which 
emphasises the large proportion of pensioners who have little or no income from 
private sources. 
TABLE 9 
The Distributional Effects of Three Possible Pensions Policies 
Policy A  
(raising IS) 
Policy B  
(raising pension and IS) 
Policy C  
(raising the pension only) 
Original income  
(£ per week) 
Number 
in range 















Under 10  2.4  4.30  98  2.20  100  0.85  58 
10-49 1.8  1.90  60  2.30  97  2.95  92 
50-99 0.8  0.40  10  2.10  95  3.95  92 
100-149 0.4  0.10  2  2.00  92  3.70  85 
150-199 0.4  0.10  2  1.80  91  3.15  81 
200-299 0.4  0  0  1.60  90  3.30  87 
300+ 0.4  0  0  1.30  76  2.80  76 
All 6.6  2.10  54  2.10  96  2.30  77 
 
Spending just over 900 million allows the income support and housing 
benefit pensioner premiums to be raised by £7 a week for a married couple and 
£4 a week for a single person. This results in immediate increases of these 
amounts for pensioners on income support. It would also result in an extra half a 
million pensioners being brought into the income support net for the first time. Fiscal Studies 
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As Table 9 confirms, such a policy directs the resources of the state directly at 
those pensioners with very little income of their own, without any extra money 
going to those with more than about £50 per week of their own income. This sort 
of policy is similar to that described as being followed by the current 
Government, only taking it rather further. 
The same money could be spent increasing the basic pension and income 
support by £3 a week for married couples and £2 for single people. As the table 
shows, such a policy would result in the same average gain in pensioners’ 
incomes as the previous one, but the increases would be spread over the whole 
pre-benefit income distribution. Those at the bottom would gain very much the 
same as everyone else, and hence less than they would under the policy targeting 
money directly at them. The different amounts involved are quite substantial. 
Under the previous policy, the poorest group of pensioners gained an average of 
£4.30 per week. Under this one, they gain £2.20 per week. 
Finally the money could be spent just on raising the basic pension without 
any corresponding increases in means-tested benefits. This would give relatively 
little to those without other income of their own, the poorest group gaining less 
than 1 per week on average, and the benefits would be spread further up the 
income distribution. 
These analyses indicate the advantages that would go with introducing a 
greater degree of means-testing into the benefit system. Resources could be 
better targeted on those in need, raising the incomes of the poorest to a higher 
level  than is possible under a system of universal benefits which are paid to all. 
By contrast,  increasing  the basic  pension  gives  money to all pensioners, 
including the relatively well off, and hence makes the cost of raising minimum 
incomes considerably greater. 
There are, however, many well-known disadvantages associated with an 
increased degree of means-testing. In the case of pensioners, the two most 
important are levels of benefit take-up and incentives to save. The latest 
available official figures suggest that in 1987 only 74 per cent of those 
pensioners entitled to supplementary benefit (income support’s predecessor) 
actually received it, though most of those not taking up benefit to which they 
were entitled were entitled only to small amounts.
5 Nevertheless this problem 
could be a major obstacle to any policy dependent on widespread means-testing. 
Part of the reason for this level of non-take-up is undoubtedly linked to the 
separation between the system of basic pensions ‘earned’ through NI 
contributions and the means-tested benefits system. In particular the survival of 
the ‘contributory principle’, if only in name, may make people feel that while 
they have earned the right to a basic pension, they have not earned the rights to 
other benefits, thereby causing more stigma to be attached to these benefits. One 
possible solution to this might lie in a form of integration of the pension and IS 
                                                                                                                                    
5 See Fry and Stark (1991) for a detailed discussion of the take-up of means-tested benefits by pensioners. What Pension Should the State Provide? 
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systems. For example, one might combine them into a single benefit, in name at 
least, called, say, the ‘retirement benefit’. Part of this would be non-means-tested 
and universal, like the current basic pension, whilst part would be income-
related, like the current IS system. On reaching pensionable age, each individual 
would claim this benefit, just as they now claim the state pension, but in doing so 
they would make a declaration of income. The non-income-related part of the 
benefit could then be paid automatically and any income-related part paid on the 
basis of the income declaration. This declaration would then need to be made 
annually to take account of changing income and benefit levels. 
Such a change would undoubtedly complicate the retirement benefit system 
administratively but could play a vital role in ensuring full take-up of benefits. 
The second problem related to means-tested benefits, that of reduced 
incentives to save for retirement, is a more fundamental result of any such 
system. While administrative schemes may be sufficient to overcome problems 
of inadequate take-up levels, reduced returns to saving over some range of 
income are a basic and inevitable result of the means-testing of incomes in 
retirement. At current levels of IS, £5 or £10 above the basic pension, this is 
unlikely to be a problem, but if it were to become the case that somebody with, 
say, £40 per week of occupational or personal pension on top of their state 
pension was no better off than somebody with no private provision at all, then 
incentive problems would undoubtedly exist. Furthermore, in this case there 
would be a straightforward problem of equity if someone who had saved money 
for retirement during a working lifetime were to see no benefit by comparison 
with someone who had spent all that they earned. Certainly this implies that the 
speed of any shift in the balance of means-tested and universal benefits must be 
determined by the speed with which the underlying pensioner income 
distribution is changing. It may also mean that some reduction in the rate of 
withdrawal of income support to below 100 per cent is appropriate. 
One could then envisage a system which worked something like the current 
family credit system. Any pensioner with income (including the basic pension) 
below a certain minimum level could receive the full extra benefit. Any income 
above this minimum would see the benefit payable reduced by a percentage of 
the difference between the income and the full benefit. For example, suppose the 
system ensured that anybody with income (including basic pension) below or 
equal to the basic state pension received a benefit to take that income to £70 
(£15.85 above the current pension) with a 70 per cent withdrawal rate on higher 
incomes. Then anyone with income above the basic pension level could receive a 
benefit equal to £15.85 −  70% ×  (15.85 −  X) where X is the amount of income 
above the basic pension level. (Again this is purely illustrative; this change 
introduced immediately would be quite expensive.) Thus while pensioners 
within this income range would see less than the full benefit of their earlier 
saving, they would at least see some benefit relative to those not saving. Fiscal Studies 
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We now have a framework within which a way forward can be seen towards 
containing social security expenditure on pensioners whilst improving the living 
standards of the poorest pensioners. To make more widespread income relation 
of benefits feasible, a change in the administrative structure of retirement 
benefits would be required, with income-related and universal elements being 
calculated and paid simultaneously. To make it equitable, a change in the 
structure of the income-related benefits themselves would be necessary, with the 
introduction of a rate of withdrawal of less than 100 per cent over a certain band 
of income. Any such system could of course maintain, and might well extend, 
the age-related parts of the current benefit system. 
The introduction of any reform along these lines would itself be a long-
drawn-out process, much as the current Government’s policy of moving the IS 
line above the pension and letting the pension fall over time relative to earnings 
is a gradual process and long-term strategy. Gradual increases in the scope of 
income-related benefits need not imply large increases in the numbers reliant 
upon them. There are currently fewer pensioners receiving income support than 
there were receiving supplementary benefit in 1979, despite higher levels of IS 
relative to the pension. This is a direct result of increasing pensioner incomes 
from other sources, including SERPS. 
The non-means-tested part of the system might be built on the basic pension 
continuing to be paid at its current real level relative to prices, which as we saw 
will actually result in a falling burden on resources because of growing earnings, 
despite demographic pressures. More money could be released to increase the 
minimum benefits available if the basic pension were under-indexed relative to 
price inflation. One per cent under-indexation could provide around 1/4 billion 
per year to add to income-related benefits. This would of course leave those 
pensioners just above the ceiling for income relation worse off than they would 
otherwise have been. The degree to which the real value of the pension is 
eroded, if at all, and to which means-testing becomes relied upon would 
inevitably be a difficult decision, and one that will depend upon the way in 
which the pensioner income distribution develops in the future. 
This policy debate cannot take place independently of government decisions 
about the provision of earnings-related pensions, either by the state or, more 
likely, through government encouragement of private pension provision. Neither 
the basic pension nor any income-related supplement is ever likely to provide a 
good level of earnings replacement except for those who have experienced very 
low pay, and it must undoubtedly be a vital part of policy to encourage the 
private provision of retirement income by the greatest possible proportion of the 
population. In this way the recent sizeable increases in pensioner incomes could 
continue and a better rate of earnings replacement be provided. Nevertheless it 
will remain the duty of government to provide as high a standard of living as 
possible, given economic and political constraints, to those pensioners with little 
or no income of their own. Until recently, universal provision of the basic What Pension Should the State Provide? 
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pension was seen as the best way of doing this. Now that many pensioners have 
high incomes of their own and given demographic pressures, it is no longer easy 
to argue that universal provision is the most effective way of maintaining the 
incomes of those in need. A system which combines income-related benefits 
with mechanisms to ensure that they are received by those who need them may 
prove to be the only way of making the significant improvements that are 
undoubtedly needed in the living standards of the poorest pensioners. 
Any changes in this area, whether along the lines described above or not, can 
only be introduced slowly. Even if a thorough review were to be undertaken 
now, and a clear strategy for both public and private sector retirement income 
provision agreed, it would be many years before the benefits of such a strategy 
would be available in full. We must not allow the drift of policy without clear 
goals to continue until a crisis of either pensioner poverty or funding is reached. 
Decisions need to be made now so that the pensioners of the next century can 
organise their affairs sensibly on the basis of sustainable public sector schemes 
for provision in retirement. 
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